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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In paraqraph 2 of its Statement of Facts, the respondent 
(Tax Commission) refers to the amount in issue as "11,855.97 plus 
interest accruing daily at $3.59." That interest would apparently 
have begun accruing after 1986. However, it would be well to 
have a calculation of the resulting total including interest. 
As indicated in the Brief of the Petitioner (Superior) 
the Auditing Division of the Tax Commission asserted that the 
total amount owing as of February 15, 1991, was $15,622.32. R. 19-20. 
Adding interest since then at the daily rate specified by the Tax 
Commission, the total is over $17,500. 
In paragraph 6 of its Statement of Facts, the Tax Commission 
simply states that its Informal Decision issued on May 5, 1988 
upheld the tax assessment. However, that Decision admittedly was 
ambiguous. 
The Order of the Tax Commission dated February 27, 1991 
included the following statement: 
Upon a reading of the Informal Decision, it 
is aoparent that the Decision is not clear. 
It is understandable why the parties do not 
agree on the interpretation of the Decision 
and why it reauires further interpretation. R. 51. 
This relates also to paragraph 9 of the Tax Commission's 
Statement of Facts, wherein it was stated that "Superior continued 
to claim that the Tax Commission's position was confusing." 
Clearly, not only did Superior make that claim, but the 
Tax Commission so found. Id. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Tax Commission's rules did not require Superior 
to collect much more sales tax from a buyer who purchased a water 
softener after even a minimal period of leasing it than from a 
buyer who bought it without first leasing it at all. 
Whether or not the water softener was sold after a 
period of leasing, it was last personal property when it was owned 
by Superior. It did not remain personal property after the salef 
but became part of the real property. Thus the applicable rules 
provided for sales tax only on the materials purchased by Superior. 
2. The Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act required the 
Tax Commission to enact a rule before charging Superior with the 
duty of collecting much more sales tax from each buyer who purchased 
a water softener after even a minimal period of leasing it than 
from a buyer who bought it without first leasing it at all. 
The Tax Commission has not shown that a rule dealing 
with the sales tax applicable to the sale of a fixture that had 
previously been leased for a period of time would affect only 
Superior, rather than a class of persons. 
Rules and statutes are construed favorable to the taxpayer, 
and the Tax Commission cannot collect taxes based on a new or 
different interpretation without first enacting a corresponding rule. 
3. Superior's actions, taken in good faith, do not evidence 
ignorance of the law. 
Superior makes the argument that its good faith should 
excuse it from any retroactive requirement it remit taxes it did 
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not and cannot collect. However, that argument does not admit nor 
demonstrate any ignorance of clear law. 
4. The Tax Commission violated suoerior's due process rights 
since the tax commission's requirements were vague; and the remedies 
for this violation are not barred. 
Superior could not have reasonably known the amount of 
sales tax the Tax Commission asserts it was required to collect. 
When Superior was required to remit more than it collected or could 
reasonably collect, its oroperty was taken without due process of 
law. 
These due orocess claims, as well as the elements of a 
claim under 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983, were presented in the Tax 
Commission proceedings. Therefore Superior is entitled to attorney's 
fees under 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1988. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE TAX COMMISSION'S RULES DID NOT REQUIRE SUPERIOR TO COLLECT 
MUCH MORE SALES TAX FROM A BUYER WHO PURCHASED A WATER SOFTENER 
AFTER EVEN A MINIMAL PERIOD OF LEASING IT THAN FROM A BUYER WHO 
BOUGHT IT WITHOUT FIRST LEASING IT AT ALL. 
On page 12 of its Brief, the Tax Commission states that 
the parties agree that when there is an outright sale of a water 
softener, "the charges for labor to install the water softeners 
are not subject to sales tax so long as they are separately stated. 
Utah Admin. R7;le R865-19-78S (1986)." 
It is true the parties agree on the tax treatment of an 
outright sale of a water softener. However, this treatment does 
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not include the necessity of separately stating the installation 
charges. 
The cited rule, as set forth in the Tax Commission's 
Appendix, states, "Installation of personal property to realty is 
not subject to tax as explained in regulations S51 and S58." 
The regulation S58 aoplies, and includes the following: 
a. Tangible personal property sold to real 
property contractors and repairmen of real 
property is generally subject to tax. The 
person who converts the personal property into 
real property is considered to be the consumer 
of the personal property since he is the last 
one to own it as personal property, [Emphasis 
added.] 
Nothing in that regulation requires the installation 
charges to be separately stated. 
The regulation S51 does discuss stating installation 
charges as a separate charge, but that regulation does not apply 
to an outright sale. It states, "See regulation S58 ... to determine 
applicable tax on personal property which becomes a part of real 
property." It then goes on to describe the tax treatment when 
tangible personal property is attached to real property but remains 
personal property. As acknowledged on page 12 of the Tax Commissions 
Brief, an outright sale of a water softener "is considered a sale 
of real property." 
Therefore, there is no requirement in an outright sale 
for the installation charges to be separately stated. 
The Tax Commission goes on to argue that Rule R865-19-51S 
does apply where Superior sells a water softener to a customer 
after having leased it to that customer for a period of time. 
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However, there is no merit to that argument, 
As stated in the Tax Commission's Brief, Rule R865-19-51S(E) 
"provides that tanqible oersonal property which is attached to 
real property, but remains tangible personal property, is subject 
to sales tax on the retail selling price of the tangible oersonal 
prooerty.11 [Emphasis added.] Specifically, the languaqe as shown 
in the Tax Commission's Appendix is as follows: 
Tangible personal property which is attached 
to real property, but remains personal property, 
is subject to sales tax on the retail selling 
price of the oersonal orooerty. [Emphasis added. ] 
The underlined language shows that this rule does not 
apply when a water softener that was being leased in a home is 
sold to the homeowner. When a water softener is sold to the 
homeowner, it becomes real oroperty, and thus it does not remain 
personal property. 
It does not make sense to argue that a water softener 
remains personal property after sale to the homeowner if he had 
been leasing it, but not otherwise. If he buys it from Superior, 
then Suoerior was the last one to own the materials as personal 
orooerty. Suoerior was thus the consumer of the personal property, 
and under the language of Rule R865-19-58S quoted above, is liable 
for the tax. 
To make such an argument is to attach significance to 
the length of time the water softener has been owned by the contractor 
(as personal prooerty) before the sale. There is nothing in the 
rules that changes the nature of any property depending on that factor. 
The parts for the water softener are purchased and the 
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unit is assembled. T. 39. Even though the unit may not be sold 
for a year, there is no sales tax on the cost to assemble it. 
Then when it is placed in the home, the sale may not yet 
be closed. It may be installed and then the homeowner reneges on 
the ourchase. Or the homeowner may be given a longer period of 
time in which to decide whether to ourchase the water softener, 
commonly using the softener on a free trial basis. T. 43. 
There is no reason to treat the sale any differently if 
the homeowner had been leasinq the water softener for a while. 
The lease would not have made its status as oersonal nrooerty any 
more permanent. It is still converted to real property uoon the 
sale to the homeowner. And Rule R865-19-58S as quoted above still 
applies. 
Thus in any event, when the water softener is sold, it 
becomes oart of the real property. Therefore the only sales tax is 
that on the component parts purchased by Superior. 
Rule R865-19-51S as quoted above would appiv, on the 
other hand, if the water softener were sold and did not become 
part of the real property. For example, suppose a oerson was renting 
an apartment and leasing a water softener from Superior, and then 
moved out. If Superior then sold the water softener to a company 
managing the apartments, that would appear to be a sale of oersonal 
property. The water softener would have been attached to the real 
property, but would have been personal property and would have 
remained personal property after the sale. 
However, the foregoing example is not an example of the 
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sales for which Superior is being assessed the additional amounts. 
The sales made by Superior have involved the conversion of personal 
property to real property. They have been governed by Rule 
R865-19-58Sf not Rule R865-19-51S. Thus Superior initially collected 
and remitted the proper amount of sales tax, and no additional 
amounts were owing. The additional amounts demanded and paid must 
therefore be returned to Superior with interest. 
This same result is reached by examination of the case 
law interpreting the applicable statutes. In the case of Utah 
Concrete Products Corp. v. State Tax Com'n, 101 U. 513, 125 P.2d 
408 (1942), the Utah Supreme Court demonstrated that contractors are 
consumers for purposes of sales tax because they are the last 
persons to deal with such objects of tangible personal property 
before they lose their identity as such. 
In the instant matter, when Superior leased and then 
sold a water softener, it was the last owner of the water softener 
when it was still classified as personal property. 
2. THE UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING ACT REQUIRED THE TAX COMMISSION 
TO ENACT A RULE BEFORE CHARGING SUPERIOR WITH THE DUTY OF COLLECTING 
MUCH MORE SALES TAX FROM EACH BUYER WHO PURCHASED A WATER SOFTENER 
AFTER EVEN A MINIMAL PERIOD OF LEASING IT THAN FROM A BUYER WHO 
BOUGHT IT WITHOUT FIRST LEASING IT AT ALL. 
As shown by the foregoing, the Tax Commission rules 
provided that Superior would not have to collect sales tax on the 
entire sales price of the water softener, even if that softener 
had already been leased to the purchaser for a period of time. 
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In addition, also as shown above, the case law interpreting 
the statutes leads to the same conclusion. 
Nevertheless, the Tax Commission asserts that it can 
require Superior to remit the sales tax (in an amount four or five 
times greater than the amount normally collected in the course of 
an outright sale of a water softener) that it should have collected 
when a water softener was sold that had been previously leased for 
a period of time. 
Assuming that such could be required despite the statutes 
and interpretive case law, it could only be done prospectively, 
pursuant to a rule enacted by the Tax Commission. 
That is, perhaps the Tax Commission could enact a rule 
providing that once a fixture is treated as personal property by 
being taxed as such under a lease oursuant to Section 59-12-103(1)(k) 
of the Utah Code, it cannot be changed to real property unless and 
until after it has been purchased by the owner of the real proper-
ty. The rule could thus clarify that the owner of the real property 
would be deemed to hold that fixture as personal property for an 
instant so that he would be the consumer of the fixture and sales 
tax would be due on the entire sales price. 
Not only has the Tax Commission never proposed or adopted 
any such rule, but it excuses itself under provisions of the Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
Its Brief notes that rulemaking is required, and only 
required, if the agency actions would affect a class of persons, 
rather than merely an individual. The Tax Commission then argues 
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on page 18 that Superior has not shown an effect on anyone else. 
"No evidence has been presented to show that other water softener 
companies similarly rent and then sell a water softener and might 
therefore be affected." 
This argument implies that the burden is on Superior to 
find other affected persons. 
In the first placef the Tax Commission would have much 
better access to the data which would orovide information on 
leases and subsequent sales of fixtures. Therefore it should bear 
any burden of proof. 
In the second place, it would seem that logic could 
suffice without the requirement of specific examples. None of the 
other rules cited refer to water softeners, and Superior makes no 
suggestion that the Tax Commission should have enacted a rule 
pertaining only to water softeners. 
It would seem logical to assume that water softeners are 
not the only fixtures that are leased. Likewise it is logical to 
assume that water softeners are not the only fixtures leased and 
then sometimes sold thereafter. 
Therefore, logic and reason demonstrate that there is a 
class of persons that would be affected by a rule dealing with the 
sales tax aoplicable to the sale of a fixture that had previously 
been leased for a period of time. 
The Tax Commission also argues on pages 17 and 18 that 
no rulemaking is required because the taxing of the transaction at 
issue is already described by statute. 
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As shown above, the statute, the case law, and the Tax 
Commission's rules show that when personal property is attached to 
real property and then sold, thus becoming part of the real property, 
sales tax is paid on the materials purchased by the contractor, not 
on the the total sales price of the fixture. Thus contrary to the 
assertion of the Tax Commission, a different sales tax treatment 
of such a purchase would be a change in policy as would mandate a 
rule. Williams v. Public Service Com'n of Utah, 720 P.2d 773 
(Utah 1986 ) . 
Not only does the Tax Commission argue that the statute 
already allows it to tax these transactions in that different 
manner, but it argues on page 18 that its interpretation of the 
statute is "straightforward." However, that interpretation is 
based on the water softener remaining "tangible oersonal property 
at the time of the sale." As indicated above, it is not tangible 
oersonal property when owned by the purchaser. The last oerson to 
own it as personal property is the contractor, Superior. 
At most, the Tax Commission offers a different plausible 
interpretation of the statute. Such an interpretation should not 
be applied here. Taxing statutes are to be construed favorable to 
the taxpayer and strictly against the taxing authority. Parson 
Asphalt Products v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 617 P.2d 397 (Utah 
1980), Pacific Intermountain Express Co. v. State Tax Com'n, 8 
U.2d 144, 329 P.2d 650 (1958). It follows that the rules of the 
taxing authority are to be construed favorable to the taxpayer and 
strictly against the taxing authority. 
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Thus, in the absence of a clear unambiguous statute 
governing the taxation of a sale of a fixture previously leased, 
it is necessary the Tax Commission to "formulate, publish and 
make available to concerned persons rules which are sufficiently 
definite and clear that persons of ordinary intelligence will be able 
to understand and abide by them." Athay v. State, Dept. of Business 
Regulation, 626 P.2d 965, 968 (Utah 1981). 
The Tax Commission certainly has not yet complied with 
that mandate. Until it does, Superior cannot be held responsible 
for remitting sales tax in the amount that the Tax Commission 
asserts Superior should have collected it. 
3. SUPERIOR'S ACTIONS, TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH, DO NOT EVIDENCE 
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW. 
In its main Brief, Superior argued that the same good 
faith which excused it from collecting sales tax based on an 
ambiguous Informal Decision should excuse it from collecting 
sales tax based on the Tax Commission's interpretation and construction 
of statutes and rules, assuming that those statutes and rules were 
ambiguous enough to allow such interpretation and construction. 
In response, the Tax Commission argued on pages 23 and 
24 of its Brief that ignorance and mistake of the law is no excuse, 
citing and quoting from various cases. However, an examination of 
the cited cases shows that the law at issue in those cases was clear 
and unambiguous, a situation quite different from the instant matter. 
For example, the case of Rosseberg v. Holesapple, 123 
U. 544, 260 P.2d 563 (1953) involved a person who forfeited the 
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principal amount he had loaned, because he sought to exact usurious 
payments. He did not know it was contrary to law. That did not 
helo him. However, there was no arqument he had not clearly 
violated a clear law. 
Likewise in the case of Walker Center Corp. v. State Tax 
Com'n, 20 U.2d 346, 437 P.2d 888 (1968) there was no question as 
to the clarity of the statute mandating the payment of a franchise 
tax if a corporation had not been dissolved before the end of the 
prior year, nor of the statute setting forth the manner for 
accompishing dissolution. The company had not followed the 
statutorily prescribed procedures within the time limit set by 
statute, and therefore clearly owed the franchise tax. 
The only ignorance claimed was of the procedures for 
expediting the dissolution process. That was the context in which 
the agency was excused from volunteering information when none was 
sought. 
That is much different from the instant matter, when the 
statutes and rules appear to be clear, but the agency seeks to 
give them a different interpretation retroactively, and excuses 
itself from informing a person that had sought interpretive information 
on the basis that the interpretation of that specific point was not 
asked about. 
Thus it is true Superior makes the argument that its good 
faith should be considered before assessing it retroactively for 
sales tax which the Tax Commission states it should have collected, 
but which it did not and cannot collect. But it is not true that 
13 
Superior was ignorant of any law, and it was certainly not ignorant 
of any clear and unambiguous law. 
4. THE TAX COMMISSION VIOLATED SUPERIOR'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS 
SINCE THE TAX COMMISSION'S REQUIREMENTS WERE VAGUE; AND THE REMEDIES 
FOR THIS VIOLATION ARE NOT BARRED. 
In its opening Brief, Superior demonstrated that if a 
statute is vague, and the noncompliance with the statute results 
in the loss of a person's property, then the due process rights of 
that person have been violated. These rights are set forth in the 
due process clauses of the Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 7, 
and the United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, each 
providing that Utah shall not deprive any person of property without 
due process of law. 
In response, on pages 27 to 29 of its Brief, the Tax 
c mmission cited and quoted from various cases dealing with due 
process rights. However, an examination of these cases shows that 
they do not contradict Superior's position. 
As was mentioned above, i the case of Walker Center 
Corp. v. State Tax Com'n, 20 U.2d 346, 437 P.2d 888 (1968) there 
wa no allegation of any vagueness in the statute mandating the 
payment of a franchise tax if a corporation had not been dissolved 
before the end of the prior year, nor in the statute setting forth 
the manner for accomplishing dissolution. The company could not 
argue that it did not know of the proscribed or prescribed conduct. 
It had not followed the statutorily orescribed procedures within the 
time limit set by statute, and therefore clearly owed the franchise 
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tax. Due process did not require the agency to volunteer information 
as to procedures available for exoeditinq the dissolution process 
when such information had not been requested. 
This is much different from the instant matter, where 
the Tax Commission claims that Superior should have identified an 
ambiguity in the statutory requirements made of it to collect 
sales tax, and then asked a question calculated to resolve that 
ambiguity. 
In the case of Chris & Dick's Lumber v. Tax Com'n, 791 
P.2d 511 (Utah 1990) the Supreme Court pointed out that there was 
no real claim that the statute was vague as to the proscribed 
conduct, but only as to the fine imposed for enqaqing in the 
proscribed conduct. 
So these cases do not apply to the instant matter. The 
vagueness in this matter goes to the conduct that is proscribed or 
prescribed, not the procedures available to facilitate orescribed 
conduct nor the penalty for engaging in proscribed conduct. 
The Tax Commission also argues that this Court should 
not consider Superior's claims based on constitutional due process 
rights, nor for attorney's fees for enforcing them, since they 
were not mentioned below. 
As was mentioned on page 12 of Superior's main Brief, 
Superior urged in documents and in argument that its constitutional 
due process rights would be violated if it were charged more in sales 
tax than it had collected. R. 29, T. 77, 83. 
Specifically, Superior included the following in its 
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Brief and Memorandum of Points and Authorities dated October 25, 1991: 
If the Auditing Division wants to impose tax 
on those transactions at four or five times 
the rate of a straight sale, the Commission 
must first approve that concept and adopt a 
rule to give notice to all taxpayers of the 
requirement. ... Without[] the agency first 
adopting rules, taxpayers are not given any 
advance notice of the requirements of the 
agency. R. 29. [Emphasis added.] 
Counsel for Superior also referred to such due process 
principles in argument before the Tax Commission: 
Without the agency first adopting rules, 
taxpayers are not given advance notice of the 
requirements of that agency. And it flies in 
the face of everything that we regard as 
sacred, that there is taxation or there is a 
law of — of — the constitutional bar against 
ex post facto laws. T. 77. [Emphasis added.] 
[Y]ou canft criticize them [Superior] for 
having made a mistake when their instructions 
were not clear. I just think it's so inherently 
a part of even-handed justice that they be 
told up front what the problem is and what 
they've got to do. They don't try — cannot 
— I tried to interpret these rules for my 
client. I had a difficult time trying to come 
up with the same conclusions that the Tax 
Commission did. I don't even know if professional 
advice would have helped. And I just think 
it's manifestly improper and wrong to impose 
this obligation on them without the Commission 
engaging in the requirements of what's required 
under the statutes of the State of Utah, -*nd 
that is to give everybody clear, unequivocable 
direction and advice for the execution of the 
fact. T. 83. [Emphasis added.] 
Thus the Tax Commission was presented with Superior's 
Constitutional due process claims, but affirmatively chose to 
ignore and disregard such claims. 
The Tax Commission also argued on page 26 of its Brief 
that no attorney's fees should be awarded because Superior "failed 
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to raise a claim under 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983 (1979) (hereinafter 
'section 1983') in the previous proceedings before the Tax Commission." 
However, the elements of such a claimf as set forth in 
the case of Signore v. City of McKeesoort, Pa., 680 F.Supp. 200 
(W.D.Pa. 1988) cited in Superior's opening Brief, were presented 
in the previous proceedings before the Tax Commission. 
That case set forth the three elements forming a cause 
of action under Section 1983: 
First, the olaintiff must allege that he has 
been deorived of a right, orivilege, or immunity 
secured by the Constitution, laws, or treaties 
of the United States. ... 
Second, the plaintiff must allege that the 
defendant subjected the plaintiff to this 
deprivation, or caused him to be so subjected. 
... 
Lastly, the plaintiff must allege that the 
defendant acted under color of a statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of a 
State. Id. at 203. 
As set forth above, Superior argued and alleged that the 
Tax Commission was depriving it of its Constitutional rights. Since 
the Tax Commission was the opposing party and an arm of the State, 
this satisfied all of the requirements under Section 1983. 
Thus Superior did raise the Constitutional due process 
issue before the Tax Commission, did raise a claim under Section 
1983, and is entitled attorney's fees under Section 1988 upon 
reversal of the Decision and Order of the Tax Commission. 
A" set forth in Superior's ouening Brief, Suoerior is 
entitled to such attorney's fees even if this Court does not reach 
the issue of the violation of the United States Constitution. 
Lorenc v. Call, 789 P.2d 46 (Utah ADD. 1990). 
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Furthermore, Superior is entitled to its attorney's fees 
for appellate work and for time spent litigating entitlement to 
the fees. Bond v. Stanton, 630 F.2d 1231 (7th Cir. 1980). 
CONCLUSION 
The Tax Commissions rules show that Superior collected 
and remitted the appropriate amount of sales and use taxes on 
water softeners it sold. The fact that some of these units had 
been leased first made no difference under the rules of the Tax 
Commission, nor under the statutes as interpreted by the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
It is unreasonable for the Tax Commission to now charge 
Superior over $15,000 for taxes it did not collect, especially 
where no clear rule covering the matter had been enacted. 
Superior's constitutionally protected due process rights 
have been violated by the Tax Commission's deprivation of Superior's 
property under color of law. Therefore this Court should order 
that the amount collected by the Tax Commission pursuant to its 
Decision and Order of February 6, 1992 be returned, and that 
Decision and Order be vacated. 
Furthermore, Superior should be awarded its costs including 
attorney fees herein. 
DATED this J *^ day of A^^*—J^ r 1992. 
LYNN P. HEWARD & DELWIN T. POND 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
LYNN P. HEWARD 
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